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To what extent, and in what sense, is it meaningful to talk about the liberal
tradition as a context within which constitutional deliberation takes place in the United
States? There certainly are very real constraints on what most of those who don black
robes and speak the language of constitutional law seem to be able to think. Justice
Robert Jackson wrote that “never in its entire history can the Supreme Court be said to
have for a single hour been representative of anything except the relatively conservative
forces of its day."2 The Constitution establishes much tighter boundary conditions for
deliberation for some legal scholars and jurists than for others, and arguments abound
about whether the principles and values expressed in that document are fixed or available
to later generations to interpret for themselves. That legal discourse has been relatively
constrained remains clear.3 It is also reasonably clear that the 2004 election assured that
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the high Court will move closer to the pole about which Justice Jackson complained than
it might have under a different electoral outcome. Movement in one direction seems to
eventuate in some course correction in another. But I’m not convinced such observations
get us any closer to an assessment of the value of the concept of a “liberal tradition.”
Scholars who reference “the liberal tradition” in American politics and law mean
somewhat differing things by it. My students identify “liberalism” with something the
Democrats used to use in the Great Society era; many conservative commentators
identify “liberalism” with what current congressional Democrats talk about. Leaving
common usage aside, I think it is fair to say that when social scientists and legal scholars
talk about “the liberal tradition” they accept the notion of certain boundary conditions
within which discussions and disagreements over principles, meanings, and values take
place. I will work with a simplifying assumption about “the liberal tradition” here.
Louis Hartz wrote The Liberal Tradition in America half a century ago, and I will accept
that understanding of the boundary conditions of political discourse—and by extension
for Hartz, political life--in the United States. To do so here, I have to leave aside quite a
few of the critiques that have been leveled at Hartz over the years.4
Hartz described the liberal tradition as one of Lockean, atomistic individualism,
wedded to Horatio Alger in the nineteenth century. He argued that the WhigHamiltonian-capitalists in the late antebellum era managed to “throw a set of chains
around” the American democrat, in effect, selling the peasant-proletariat hybrid a bill of
goods which became an ideological straightjacket.5 We were all simply hoodwinked by
the Whigs, who wooed us with equality of opportunity—a materialist dream--while they
themselves won the race.6 American political thought became fixed in time,
impoverished and static.
For Hartz, American political thought was remarkably homogeneous and
consensual; self-evident truths were beyond examination. While the heirs of the liberal
tradition reacted with hysteria to challenges from the left,7 the basic portrait painted was
of struggles that were not life and death ones. While the Civil War has always served to
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challenge Hartz’s consensus view, American political dynamics in the past 30-35 years
are also offering a serious affront to Hartz’s construct. As Sean Wilentz recently noted,
“[t]he great weakness of Hartz’s approach was that, as a unified field theory of American
political thought, it turned politics in a modern liberal polity into fake battles fought with
wooden swords.”8
Writing during the Cold War and at the end of the McCarthy era, Hartz accepted
the premise common to far more radical theorists of the era that ideas were the product of
relations among social classes. We could describe his argument in terms of how America
missed-the-boat. Lacking a feudal past, there was no genuine aristocracy in America
against which a nascent bourgeoisie could formulate its own identity and revolution; it
followed that the American peasant-proletariat never developed a working-class
consciousness during the rise and maturation of the industrial system. Having failed to
turn to socialism during this key time, America was rendered immune to such appeals
(though not from fear of them). Thus, it was not material conditions per se but the class
dynamics presented at key historical moments that mattered. The American peasantproletariat had, in effect, become hermetically sealed off from foreign ideas and foreign
appeals. The ocean turns out to have been a big deal in American political development.
In the new world, Locke equaled Burke. That is what Americans conserved, and became
“exceptional” in their immunity to class conflict and what that produced in Europe.
Hartz talked about how class-based experiences nevertheless produced atomistic
individualism. He recognized (though hardly uniquely) the centrality of property and
possession to the Constitution we framed and the political struggles we experienced. He
understood that political discourse is patterned and that new ideas had to have strong,
indigenous roots if they were going to be able to grow. And he concluded that America
was extremely unlikely to become more self-aware or grow new ideas.9
Some of this characterization of the liberal tradition is valuable for us. We
certainly see that the law generally treats people as individuals. Discussion of groups or
classes of citizens has weak traction. As Scalia wrote in Adarand, “Individuals who have
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been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our
Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept
is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individuals . . . In the eyes of government, we
are just one race here.”10 Property is a core value, and we have seen its protection
ratcheted up during the Rehnquist Court years in regulatory takings cases.11 Standing
privileges injuries that can be expressed as discrete economic losses over injuries that are
widely shared, more attenuated, or of a non-economic sort (e.g., some environmental
harms). The fact that Americans are heirs of Locke is certainly apparent. But our
political heritage is also of Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment,12 of Machiavelli,13 of
Hobbes,14 and the Puritans.15 The Constitution is not pure Locke. These other traditions
bring striking potential for tensions.
Several scholars have labored to save Hartz from consensus politics by positing
two or several poles of political discourse, each reflecting a different perspective on the
relationship between liberal principles. J. David Greenstone offered a more dynamic
picture of American politics, with special tension between humanist liberal perspectives
(basically the Lockean atomistic individualism of Hartz) and reform liberal perspectives
(identified with Dewey, Addams, and the progressive impulse to use the state positively,
to insure that all citizens can develop their faculties). American political struggles were,
then, quite real; bipolarity best expresses the way in which different thinkers and groups
understood tensions between competing values, such as between liberty and union in the
1850s. There were, in Greenstone’s view, nevertheless boundary conditions within
which our disagreements took place, and these disagreements were liberal ones.16 When
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Greenstone turned his attention to the Court, he likewise saw different but patterned ways
in which justices resolved tensions over principles. Ronald Kahn, a student of
Greenstone, has argued that polity and rights principles guide judicial decision making,
and that these “are the basic filters through which doctrines of popular sovereignty and
fundamental rights confront each other.”17 For Kahn, different justices weigh principles
of popular sovereignty and individual rights differently, but all are members of an
interpretive community in which principle, not instrumentality rules.18 Principle,
precedent, and the legal culture establish rules of discourse and bounds within which that
discourse takes place. Liberalism seems to still describe those boundaries.
Rogers Smith’s typology of republican, ascriptive, and liberal traditions captures
the point that we have a richer (in his view, not better) and wider set of enduring
narratives to which political elites can appeal in American politics.19 And alternative
understandings of American political and legal traditions better capture the extent to
which “articulations of citizenship have always depended upon the exclusion of
constructed and ascribed others.”20
I suspect that the notion of American “exceptionalism” had particular purchase
during the Cold War era. When the meaning of America was formulated as an antithesis
to the Soviet Union, distinctions with the old world, where communist and socialist
appeals tended to be seductive through at least 1968, were highlighted over similarities.
In a polar world, America was a pole apart. In the post-Soviet era, does America indeed
look as exceptional?
The very notion of a liberal tradition as Hartz uses it is problematic. A “liberal”
tradition that stretches to encompass everything that Hartz tries to encompass ceases to
have much explanatory power. Variants on the ‘American exceptionalism’ thesis are not
likely to help us understand the ways in which the politics of a limited social welfare state
were patterned in the United States, nor are American exceptionalism likely to help us
understand meaningful political contingencies and possibilities.21 Even if we
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acknowledge Hartz’s astute observation that the social welfare policies of the New Deal
era were chiefly pragmatic and never given a well-developed philosophical
underpinning,22 it would be hard to contend that this explains the current erosion of many
U.S. welfare state provisions since parallel erosions can be found in Europe.
Hartz wrote during a period taken with the idea of a single national “character.”
His vision seemed to better suit an era in which academics talked about “false
consciousness” or cooptation than an era in which social scientists and legal scholars
think about ways in which groups and communities actively participate in the creation of
political meanings and understandings and are not merely passive recipients of
communications from elites. Or, in current terminology, institutional actors and activists
participate in constructing constitutional meanings outside the Court.
Consensus and stasis have yielded to perceptions of conflict as the driving force
in American political development.23 The notion of a bounded liberal tradition is one
that suggests that Americans (other than extraneous fringe elements) participate in a
universe of shared discourse. We understand each other when we speak—and speak
about constitutional values--but to ask Stanley Fish’s question, is there a text in this
class?24 If we strike the balance between the value of free speech and equal protection
differently, is it the case that we nonetheless abide by the winner’s rules and don’t
consider ourselves permanent losers?25 At a minimum, this requires some faith in the
pluralist formulation that coalitions are shifting and that openness in the process doesn’t
rig the game on behalf of some privileged discourses or perspectives that are actually
held out there. Mark Tushnet has argued very effectively, in my view, that we cannot
assume that people are part of a shared community of understanding just because they are
using the same words.26
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As institutions have returned to the foreground in the study of politics, scholars
of American political development have been reconceptualizing the dynamics of political
change.27 If different patterns of development characterize different institutional
formations, as Orren and Skowronek contend, this leads to conflict over norms, rules, and
terms of control among them that have repercussions throughout the polity.28 Instead of
an integrated political system, “relations among political institutions are (at least) as
likely to be in tension as in fit and the tension generated is an important source of
political conflict and change.”29 Political actors may exploit tensions and contradictions
that exist because of these institutional mismatches, and there is potential for creativity by
actors of all sorts.30 In this view, the political universe “is inherently open, dynamic, and
contested” and “existing norms and collective projects, of varying degrees of permanence
are buffeted against one another as a normal condition.”31 American politics are
patterned by institutions and norms, but these are dynamic; America is not somehow
stuck in an ever-recurring drama.

The second point to note is that there is also something very wrong about Hartz’s
secularism. Neither the Puritans nor religion more generally were very important to his
story about American political thought. As we follow legal battles over relations between
church and state ranging from school prayer to the teaching of Intelligent Design, funding
faith-based initiatives and various forms of state aid flowing toward religious education,
it is hard to believe that religion can be relegated to a mere footnote in American political
development. And when we add in struggles over abortion, recognition of gay rights, and
issues of public decency and morality, the list of issues engaging religious convictions
gets very long indeed. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press confirm
that religion is much more important to American survey respondents than to people
living in other wealthy nations.32
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Following the publication of The Liberal Tradition in America, scholars
repeatedly pointed to the important place of religious meanings and tropes in American
political discourse and thought.33 America was a promise and destiny as well as a place;
failure was collective treason as well as a matter of personal culpability. Sacred and
secular rewards were conflated. Puritanism generated a special American telos—in
Sacvan Bercovitch’s words, the myth of America.34 The historical was more than manmade, and a religiously-infused story about the meaning of America helped constitute
and give meaning to future experience.
Recently, both Jim Morone and Jim Block, in different ways, have worked to
supplant the storybook truth about America told by Hartz, and have done a fine job of
remedying Hartz’s secularist defect. Morone poses a near-constant battle in American
politics between those he calls Progressives and those termed Victorians. The former
emphasize systemic sources of sin and urge social and political reform; the latter
emphasize personal responsibility for sin and have their most recent flowering in
Reaganism. These opposing political forces are moved by different senses of social
justice, and are both locked in battles between us and them.35 Arguing that “[l]iberal
political history underestimates the roaring moral fervor at the soul of American
politics,”36 Morone brings this moral fervor and these pitched, fierce political battles to
life. According to Morone, “American politics developed from revival to revival,” and
moral crusaders played a powerful if underappreciated role in American state-building.37
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Hartz’s liberalism had little to do with morals or with virtue, but “[f]or better or worse,
moral conflicts made America.”
Block posits an entirely different narrative of American history from Hartz, rooted
in the notion of agency rather than liberty, and foregrounding America’s Puritan religious
heritage. Hartz, in Block’s analysis, conjured away all traces of a religious heritage,
missing the import of Anglo-American Protestant notions of the American self. Key
struggles in American politics have been between those who believe liberty requires
traditions, institutions, and authority to inculcate habits of virtue and those who seek to
achieve liberal autonomy without such imposed constraints. Liberation and constraint
have been interconnected in the American project; Americans forged their character as
they worked out their relationship to authority in distinctive ways unavailable to their
European forebears. Although Locke remains important to this project, Block argues that
“the great theorist of agency civilization,” for America was Hobbes.38 Agency as
understood by the Puritans, Block argues, involves “individuals participating actively in
shaping the worldly means to be employed for realizing divine and collective purposes. . .
[a]gency exists only with reference to a principal, a designator, an author/ity.”39 Fissures
in American political life can be better understood in terms of the tensions between
notions of agency as natural and requiring no institutional coercion, and a sectarian
Protestant vision of an exclusive religious community.40 For Block, Americans have
managed to ensnare themselves in forms of resubordination, and “as a nation we have
lost our way.”41 Writing before 9-11, Block argues that there has been a collapse of the
national narrative, the view that America stands “as a collective experiment in human
liberty and as such a model and symbol for the aspirations of the world.”42
Culture wars frequently seem to dwarf or supplant economic issues in American
politics. During periods I have studied intensely—the Gilded Age and the Progressive
Era—there were a number of moral crusades in which moral issues came to serve as
shorthand for what America needed in order to be restored to the right path. Everything
from the obvious temperance crusades to white slavery, eugenics, the late suffrage
campaign, Americanization, religious revivals, purging libraries of sensational fiction, the
rise of the YMCA, orphan trains, the Boy Scouts, and the push for pure food and drugs
serve as examples. I have read the Boston Unitarian-inspired Alger story (which made
its first appearance in 1864, during the Civil War and not, as Hartz would have it, in
1840) as an allegory of the adolescent Republic, where the young person’s rite of passage
was vital to the welfare of the community; the character of the young and the character of
the Republic were inextricably bound. Character formation was possibly the centerpiece
38
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of political concern if the viability of the Republic depended upon its virtue, as the Alger
story would appear to suggest. And in Alger’s universe, natural value is juxtaposed to
artifice, and solid and simple virtues are juxtaposed to social pretense and to fancy,
artificial manners.43 Even the Alger story, then, was not simply secular or materialistic,
and participated in culture wars of the latter decades of the nineteenth century.
So Hartz missed important religious underpinnings of American political fervor.
He missed the ferocity of the battles for the soul of the Republic and its youth. He
missed how closely these issues were entwined. He missed how vital these struggles
were for their participants, since he thought struggles over ideas in America were not lifeand-death ones. He could not adequately specify the relationship between culture wars
and liberalism. He did not have a good explanation for the deep divides that can open up
in American politics, including around contemporary issues such as gay marriage,
abortion, patriotism, and separation of church and state. While Hartz maintained that
Americans do not think in terms of class even if they belong, in some sense, to classes,
his sense of the political operates on a material plane and his notion of social class is
materialist, based in the relationship to ownership and control of the means of production.
It is no wonder that Hartz leaves us at sea when it comes to current domestic politics and
legal struggles.
Surveys have documented the deepening polarization of the American public.44 In
November, 2005, 80% of self-identified Republicans approved of President Bush’s
performance in office while only 7% of self-identified Democrats did.45 Congressional
voting is more polarized than at any time in the past century.46 Keith Poole, one of the
experts in Congressional roll call voting, has pointed out that the last time voting was so
polarized, America experienced quite a bit of political violence.47 This polarization is
43
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linked, I would contend, to the claims Americans heard about the 2004 election being
“the most important” in our lifetimes because in this polarized electorate, competing
moral visions are at stake. Values—and competing values--are very important to the
discourse of American politics. At least one side in the culture wars pitches battles in
apocalyptic language.
Political battles in the United States are likely to be expressed in appeals to timehonored traditions and values, and often are expressed in constitutional language. We do
tend to constitutionalize our political struggles, perhaps an indication of the extent to
which the Court has become part of our strategic calculus in politics. The Constitution
becomes a weapon to fight with, and it means different things to different contestants. If
we look to American history, we will find plenty of struggles over constitutional
meaning.48 The outcomes of these struggles tell us quite a bit about power, mobilization,
political opportunities, and institutional change. We often learn about contingency and
possibility rather than inevitability. I do not think we learn very much about these
struggles—or even see most of them—by positing a bounded “liberal tradition” in
American political or legal discourse. And it may be that by thinking in terms of
boundaries instead of narratives or patterns in political discourse, we also miss
opportunities to remain open to new possibilities.
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